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Centre for Tax Policy and Administration 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
 
 
Lausanne, 6 March, 2019  
 
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy – 
Comments on the Public Consultation Document 
 
Dear David,  
On behalf of the Tax Policy Center of the University of Lausanne (Switzerland), we are 
pleased to attach herewith our comments relating to the public consultation Document: 
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy.  
We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments as the international tax policy 
issues raised by the digitalisation of the economy represent a core research priority of 
our institute.  
As a matter of principle, we fully support the work of the OECD in this area.  
With respect to Pillar 1, we believe that a potential solution should be articulated around 
four core principles. First of all, any solution should be based on a sound policy rationale. 
Secondly, such solution should be a neutral and not ring-fenced. Thirdly, the solution 
should strive to pursue the path of achieving simplicity and legal certainty as opposed to 
complexity, especially, with respect to profit allocation. Finally, the preferred option 
should be complemented by an enhanced dispute resolution framework.  
At this stage, it seems to us that the marketing intangible proposal would meet the first 
two of the foregoing criteria. However, with respect to profit allocation we believe that 
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the option of resorting to pre-determined margins / deemed formulas / fixed percentages 
should be given further consideration. 
With respect to Pillar 2 (Global Anti Base Erosion Proposal), we are of the opinion that 
the policy rationale for introducing this proposal is unclear at this stage and that the 
existence of a possible overlap with Pillar 1 has not been sufficiently addressed. 
Moreover, the Global Anti Base Erosion Proposal, which would entail a significant policy 
shift as compared to the original scope of the BEPS initiative, seems to be justified by the 
fact that the changes introduced by BEPS Actions 8-10 as well as BEPS Action 5 are 
insufficient. We believe that such conclusion should be adequately assessed before 
introducing new changes to the international tax system. For these reasons, we express 
a reservation on this proposal due to its unclear rationale and objective. 
This being said, our comments on Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 have to be considered as 
preliminary and would of course need to be refined/revisited once the details of the 
various policy options are further known.  
We would be glad to get the opportunity to attend the public consultation and present 
our view detailed in this document.   
Yours sincerely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof Dr. Robert J. Danon 
Professor of International Tax Law  
Director 
Tax Policy Center, UNIL  
 
 
Dr. Vikram Chand  
Lecturer in International Tax Law 
Executive Director, LLM Program in International 
Taxation (MASIT) and Executive Program in Transfer 
Pricing (EPTP) 
Tax Policy Center, UNIL    
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1. Policy assessment of the BEPS Action plan before entering into 
the digital debate 
1.1. Analysis of recommendations based on activity concepts  
1. The initial objective of the BEPS project was to ensure that profits are taxed 
where activities generating the profits take place and value is created. On the 
other hand, the BEPS Project did not formally aim at revisiting the allocation 
of taxing rights provided, in particular, by the OECD Model1. Likewise, a harmonisation 
of tax rates was not foreseen2. However it was clear that certain activity-based 
                                   
1  This position was clearly expressed by the BEPS Action Plan in 2013: “While actions to 
address BEPS will restore both source and residence taxation in a number of cases where 
cross-border income would otherwise go untaxed or would be taxed at very low rates, these 
actions are not directly aimed at changing the existing international standards on the 
allocation of taxing rights on cross-border income (OECD Action Plan 2013, p. 12) 
2     See for example the final report on BEPS Action 5 : « The work on harmful tax practices is not 
intended to promote the harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures generally within or 
outside the OECD, nor is it about dictating to any country what should be the appropriate 
level of tax rates. Rather, the work is about reducing the distortionary influence of taxation 
on the location of mobile financial and service activities, thereby encouraging an 
environment in which free and fair tax competition can take place. This is essential in moving 
towards a “level playing » 
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concepts needed to be reinforced such as “control over risks” and “DEMPE” / 
“substantial activities” (nexus approach), the latter being applicable mainly for trade 
intangibles. The interim report has also highlighted that several MNEs have realigned 
their tax arrangements with real economic activity to achieve the foregoing.3 
1.2. Analysis of recommendations made to the PE threshold: BEPS 
Action 7  
2. The provisions recommended by BEPS Action 7 to amend Article 5 have not 
been implemented widely.4 Moreover for States that amended the definition, 
several issues arise with respect to profit allocation to PEs5. As a starting 
point, profit allocation under the separate entity approach or the Authorized 
OECD approach (AOA), depends on significant people functions, assets 
employed and risks assumed. This being said, a tension arises between the 
nexus and profit allocation concepts when the PE does not carry out any 
activities. This is typically the case when a Non-resident Enterprise (NRE) acts 
through a related commissionaire (dependant agent or DA) and the activities 
of the DA trigger a dependent agent PE (DAPE) for the NRE. Arguably, as the 
DAPE does not carry out any activities by itself (no functions, assets and 
risks) its remuneration should be nil under the principles laid down by Article 
7. However, this position is disputable. In light of the recent guidance issued 
on profit allocation to such PEs, market jurisdictions may argue for additional 
profit attribution to DAPEs. Consequently, BEPS Action 7 creates an uncertain 
profit allocation environment for DAPEs. Moreover, a trend consisting in 
opting for limited risk distribution models (LRDs) has been observed.  The 
interim report highlighted this strategy and has remarked that several digital 
businesses, which have operated on a remote basis, have changed their 
business models and have created the so-called “resellers”6 in the market 
State.  
                                   
3 OECD, 2018 Interim Report, Para. 308. 
4 OECD, 2018 Interim Report, Para. 272. 
5  See thereupon inter alia Robert Danon, Can Tax Treaty Policy Save Us ? The Case of the 
Digital Economy in: Brian J. Arnold (.dit.), Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project : a tribute to 
Jacques Sasseville, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto 2018, p. 75 ss, Vikram Chand/Lisa 
Spinosa , A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models : Should the Permanent 
Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the Issue or Should the Focus Be on Shared 
Taxing Rights Mechanism ? , Intertax 2018, vol. 46, p. 476 ss, 
6  OECD, 2018 Interim Report, Para. 262. 
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1.3. High level assessment  
3. Against this background, some members of the inclusive framework argue 
that despite the changes introduced by BEPS actions 8-10 and 5, profit 
shifting to low tax jurisdictions remains possible. Further, this would also 
imply that traditional or digital businesses, through a centralized business 
model, can operate in the market States with low risk distribution models 
(LRDs) and ensure that only limited returns are allocated to those entities.7 At 
the same time,  however, it should be be noted that the concepts introduced 
in the BEPS Action Plan are highly subjective (activity or PE based concepts). 
It is obvious that if the degree of subjectivity is high in the interpretation 
process then the chances of the tax outcome being uncertain is also high. 
Consequently, the chances for tax disputes also increase as well as the risk 
for double or multiple taxation. This proposition clearly holds true once the 
structures adopted by taxpayers will become fully transparent to the tax 
administrations through the Master File (which requires the taxpayer to 
explain its value chain) and Country-by-Country reporting. 
2. Pillar I of the digital debate: Revising profit allocation and 
nexus rules   
2.1. Conceptual basis for taxing cross border business income 
4. Currently, cross border business income is taxed in the Country where the 
productions factors are located. As discussed, the BEPS Project has reinforced 
the application of this approach by aligning taxation with value creation. As a 
fundamental starting point, however, a clarification would be welcome as to 
whether the conceptual basis for sharing the international corporate tax base 
is to be based on production factors or destination factors (such as the 
existence of a customer base) or production and destination factors? The 
report, in the context of the marketing intangible proposal, seems to focus on 
endogenous factors as opposed to exogenous factors8 but this needs further 
consideration as developing markets argue for the latter factors to be taken 
into consideration. 
 
                                   
7 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 3. 
8 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 33. 
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2.2. The User Participation proposal  
5. The proposal is premised on the fundamental assumption that in the value 
creation process of a digital firm “users” of a platform create value.9 
Specifically, depending on the digitalized business, active participation of 
users, by generating content or providing data, creates value. In other words, 
their contribution leads to network effects and externalities and enhances the 
brand image and value of the platform.10 However, this assumption seems to 
be highly debatable as several arguments can be made that user participation 
and contribution is a regular business input in the production / processing 
process.11 Moreover, the manner in which the proposal is presented, it clearly 
amounts to ring fencing as it only applies to social media platforms, search 
engines and intermediation platforms12. Furthermore, devising a proposal with 
a narrow scope makes it less flexible to adapt it to future business models 
where digitalization may play a key role. As the policy rationale seems to be 
built on a highly debatable basis13, a technical assessment of this proposal will 
not be made hereafter. 
 
6. Similar to the user participation model, short-term measures such as the EU 
DST are not built on a sound policy rationale. Moreover, these measures could 
conflict with international obligations (notably in our view with tax treaties14) 
as well as the Constitutional law of certain countries. Therefore, we are of the 
opinion that such measures should also not be pursued as they can lead to 
double taxation, distortions and be challenged at a later stage. 
                                   
9 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 18. 
10 HM Treasury, March 2018, Corporate Tax and Digital Economy, pp. 7-10; OECD, 2018 Interim 
Report, Paras. 37-38. 
11 OECD, 2018 Interim Report, Para. 39; OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 61. 
12 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 19. 
13  See also thereupon Itai Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation , British Tax Review 2018, 
p. 407 ss, 
14   See thereupon Robert Danon, Can Tax Treaty Policy Save Us ? The Case of the Digital Economy 
in: Brian J. Arnold (.dit.), Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project : a tribute to Jacques Sasseville, 
Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto 2018, p. 75 ss 
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2.3. Significant Economic Presence (SEP) proposal   
7. The SEP proposal is premised on the assumption that digitalization has 
enabled, to an unprecedented extent, an enterprise to actively intervene in 
the economic life of another country without having significant physical 
presence therein.15 This proposition seems to be a reasonable suggestion 
from the perspective of the application of the benefit principle. This implies 
that the State in which the non-resident is actively present through digital 
means or otherwise is justified to exercise tax jurisdiction.  
 
8. On the other hand, if the policy rationale of the proposal is based on the fact 
that the production and destination factors should be taken into consideration 
for taxing cross business income then this would entail a substantial shift in 
the current framework. Such an approach may also not be in line with the 
value creation standard.  
 
9. At this point, we are not clear as to whether the SEP proposal follows the 
former or latter rationale. Even if it follows the former then the State 
exercising its taxing rights should not argue that all or majority of the profits 
arising from the presence should be taxable in that State. Taxation should be 
limited to the benefits that the non-resident taxpayer receives from the State 
as opposed to general specific local market features available in that State. 
 
10. With respect to scope of the nexus,16 the proposal seems to apply to an 
enterprise that exceeds a revenue threshold combined with one or more of 
the following factors: user based factors (such as the user base or volume of 
data collected17) or digital factors (such as maintaining a website in local 
language and payment options in local currency18). The proposal also refers to 
“other factors” such as responsibility for the final delivery of goods to 
customers or the provision by the enterprise of other support services and 
sustained marketing and sales promotion activities. 
 
 
                                   
15 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 50. 
16 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 51. 
17 OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report. Para. 280. 
18 OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report. Para. 279. 
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11. Firstly, the scope of the proposal seems to be rather unclear as to whether it 
applies to all businesses or business that employ digital means or only digital 
enterprises. If it applies only to business that employ digital means or only 
digital enterprises, then this may amount to ring fencing. Secondly, with 
these “other factors”, the proposal seems to capture a broader category of 
businesses either traditional or digital. However, as a discussion on the 
application of these “other factors” has not been made in the BEPS Action 1 
report, more guidance on the rationale behind these “other factors” would be 
required.  
 
12. Moreover, special consideration needs to be made to situations where local 
entities of a MNE can be considered to be key risk bearing entities based on 
their functional profile. For instance, when Company R in Country R, which 
operates in the cloud business, sells its services to its related full-fledged 
distributor, Company S a resident of State S, which then sells those services 
to clients. Under the current rules, the profit split method could possibly apply 
to split the profits between Company R and Company S due to their strong 
functional profiles. In this situation, it should be foreseen that Company R 
should not be subject to the SEP proposal as substantial profits are being 
taxed in the hands of Company S. 
 
13. If the SEP nexus is implemented by amending the PE definition, an issue 
arises as to how does the SEP proposal interact with the fixed place or agency 
PE concept and their related attribution rules? 
 
14. There may be a possibility that the existing PE concepts may be absorbed by 
the SEP proposal and hence they may become redundant. On the other hand, 
it may also be possible that the SEP concept could coexist with the existing PE 
concepts. In this case, “rules of order” should be put into place to resolve the 
issue of which provision applies first. The co-existence of all these rules could 
also imply that MNEs may plan and fragment their activities to take 
advantages of different rules.  
 
15. This proposal requires an in-depth consideration of such issues. 
 
16. A similar issue arises with respect to coordination with profit attribution rules. 
Some States follow the separate entity and AOA approach to allocate profits 
to a PE. Under the AOA, it has been argued on several occasions that the 
existing rules fail to allocate profits to a new nexus such as the SEP. This is 
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because significant people functions are not performed in the market 
jurisdiction. However, some other States follow formulary approaches. These 
States may allocate profits to PE by using formulas based on, for instance, 
sales. For these States, allocation of profits to a SEP, should not pose a big 
challenge.  
 
17. This said, we believe that profit attribution rules should be uniformly adopted 
for the purpose of this proposal. If the attribution rules are non-uniform, the 
principle of equality and neutrality could be breached.  
 
18. Thus, the greatest difficulty with this proposal pertains to designing uniform 
profit allocation rules as opposed to nexus rules.   
 
19. To solve the attribution issue, one approach that the proposal contemplates is 
to adopt a fractional apportionment method.19 At this stage it is not clear as 
to whether the proposal is applicable at the level of the MNE Group20 or at the 
level of entity, which could trigger a SEP. If the former approach is adopted, 
the proposal will raise well-known issues that have been heavily debated in 
the context of the European Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. 
Moreover, as rightly pointed out in the BEPS Action 1 report this approach 
departs from the current international standards, which are based on the 
separate entity approach and the arm’s length principle.21 Even if such an 
approach is foreseen to be applicable at an entity level, it is difficult to foresee 
that States will agree to uniform weights that have to be allocated to profit 
allocation factors such as employees, assets or sales. Thus, it would make 
sense to focus on other approaches as discussed below. 
 
20. An alternate approach, which is discussed, entails resorting to a deemed profit 
methodology.22 This method, initially, deems the SEP to be equivalent to a 
physical presence from which the non-resident enterprise is operating a 
business. Thereafter, the method determines deemed net income of the SEP 
by applying a ratio of presumed expenses to the non-resident enterprise’s 
                                   
19 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 52; OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report, Para. 287.  
20  OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 53. The consultation document refers to the “global 
profit rate of the MNE Group”. Also, see Para. 56.  
21 OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report, Para. 288.  
22 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 54; OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report, Para. 289. 
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revenue derived from transactions concluded with customers in the market 
jurisdiction. The ratio could be determined on the basis of a number of 
factors, such as by making references to industry profit margins of domestic 
taxpayers. For example, an online advertiser (non-resident enterprise) could 
be classified under the advertisement industry and its SEP could be allocated 
profits on the basis of profit margins derived by comparable advertisement 
businesses in the market state.23 This approach, the way it has been 
presented, seems easy to administer. Also, the approach could seem to fit in 
the existing framework as it requires a comparability analysis, at least with 
industry margins. However, as rightly pointed out by the Action 1 report, 
several issues do arise.24 Therefore, further analysis need to be carried out as 
to whether the issues raised in the context of this approach can be resolved.  
 
21. If not, another approach could also be considered in the context of the 
deemed profit methodology. For instance, the taxable base could be 
calculated by resorting to two steps. Under the first step, the overall profit to 
be allocated would be calculated in the proportion of total operating profit of 
the enterprise multiplied by the ratio between the local turnover and total 
turnover. Thereafter, in the second step, a pre-determined portion of the 
amount calculated in Step 1 (for example, 5-20%) will be allocated back to 
the SEP. Although the profit allocation under this proposal may seem to be 
modest, this approach seems to be justified in light of the “benefits” provided 
by the market. The benefits being, for instance, providing a legal framework 
for a non-resident as opposed to the benefit of providing a large consumer 
base (demand factor). Moreover, under this approach, where the profits 
allocated to the SEP is more than the overall profit margin of the MNE to 
which the enterprise belongs (based on its consolidated financial statements) 
then the profits of the SEP should be adjusted downwards. Such an approach 
could be used as a proxy to ensure that the SEP is not allocated profits in 
excess of the operating margins reported by the MNE Group. This approach 
would be in line with the logic developed in the context of BEPS Action 4 
wherein an entity in a MNE can deduct interest in its jurisdiction up to the 
level of the net interest / EBIDTA ratio of its group. Alternatively, multilateral 
consensus could be reached by agreeing to common deemed margins that 
have to be allocated to the SEP. 
                                   
23 OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report. Para. 290. 
24 OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report. Para. 291. 
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22. The SEP proposal contemplates using withholding taxes as a collection or 
enforcement mechanism25. As the withholding tax will be applied in a non-
final manner, it will still be necessary to determine the allocation of profits to 
the SEP. As discussed above, this may not be an easy task. Consequently, as 
another option, the application of a final withholding tax could be explored as 
an independent option to reduce complexity.  
 
23. As the proposal may follow an entity approach as opposed to the MNE 
approach, the relief mechanism under this proposal is straightforward. The 
country of the taxpayer’s residence will provide relief for the taxes paid in the 
SEP state based on either the exemption or the credit method. 
2.4. Marketing intangibles proposal    
24. The marketing intangibles proposal is premised on the rationale that an 
enterprise, traditional or digital (including businesses dependent on user 
participation), can actively be present in another jurisdiction on a remote 
basis or through a limited local presence such as a LRD to develop existing or 
new marketing intangibles such as brands, trade names, customer data, 
customer lists and customer relationships.26 
 
25. This implies that when the non-resident is actively present through digital or 
traditional means in another jurisdiction it creates marketing intangibles. Due 
to the footprint created by marketing intangibles the market State is justified 
to exercise tax jurisdiction. This proposition seems to be a reasonable 
suggestion and it could comply with the benefit principle. Such an approach, 
arguably, also seems to be consistent with the value creation standard.27 
Therefore, it could be justified that the profit allocable to marketing 
intangibles be taxed to a certain extent in the market jurisdiction. As rightly 
pointed out by the proposal, only the profit allocable to marketing intangibles 
should be within the scope of this proposal. The profit allocable to trade 
intangibles should be carved out.28 
                                   
25 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 55. 
26 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Paras. 30-31. 
27 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 33. 
28 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 34. 
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26. In fact, such a proposal could also mitigate profit-shifting concerns to a 
certain extent. It may well be true that under the post BEPS rules, profit 
attributable to marketing intangibles can be stripped out of the market State, 
i.e. the State where they are created. For instance, consider the situation of 
Company R in Country R (a low tax State), which operates in the business of 
branded products, sells its products to its related LRD, Company S a resident 
of State S, which then sells those products to clients. Under the current rules, 
the LRD is compensated with a routine margin and the residual profits move 
out of State S. Thus, this proposal seeks to reallocate a part of the residual 
profits that are attributable to the marketing intangibles to the market 
State.29 
 
27. The question arises as to how does one determine the residual profit allocable 
to marketing intangible, which could be reallocated to the market State. One 
approach would be to rely on a facts and circumstances analysis that is the 
current transfer pricing approach30. Under this approach the contribution of 
marketing intangibles to the overall profits needs to be determined. 
Thereafter, a portion of the profit linked to marketing intangibles will need to 
be reallocated to the market State. Clearly, this approach involves a high 
degree of subjectivity. This could also lead to tax uncertainty and a plethora 
of tax disputes. An alternate approach to evaluate the contribution of 
marketing intangibles would rely on costs (capitalized or not) incurred to 
develop marketing intangibles.31 Once again, this approach involves a high 
degree of complexity. 
 
28. Thus, in order to avoid these issues, it would be desirable to foresee the 
application of a simplified residual profit allocation mechanism32 that would 
use mechanical approximations or fixed contribution percentages.33 The 
simplified mechanism could be based on deemed margins and formulaic 
                                   
29 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Paras. 35-37. 
30 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 45 and 46. 
31 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 47. 
32 For example, see https://mnetax.com/marketing-intangibles-solution-to-digital-tax-dispute-
should-apply-only-to-consumer-facing-businesses-us-official-says-32441  
33 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 47 and 48. 
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approaches both at a routine, residual and reallocation level. The reallocation 
could be based on either sales or in certain cases, users34. This would achieve 
ease of administration35. It would be preferable to develop this approach at 
the level of the MNE as opposed to a business line segmentation as the latter 
raises significant data availability and administration issues36.  
 
29. This proposal, the way it has been presented, may not create issues related to 
ring fencing as it applies across the board to all MNEs.37 Appropriate nexus 
rules will need to be developed to implement this proposal. Our suggestion 
would be to design such rules on the basis of turnover only. This would imply 
that the additional factors reflected in the SEP proposal would not be reflected 
in this approach. Moreover, such nexus rules need to be designed 
independently from the PE framework in order to avoid overlaps with fixed 
place PE or agency PE rules38.  
 
30. As the profits that will be allocated to the market are based on a group level 
determination, the issue arises as to which entity in the group should bear the 
tax liability and provide for double tax relief39. In this regard, it could be 
foreseen that the relief should be provided by the owner of the intangible or / 
and the user of the intangible within the Group.  
3. Pillar II: Global Anti Base Erosion Proposal (GLOBE) 
3.1. Policy rationale 
31. In the BEPS Action 1 Report, no recommendation was made with respect to 
specific measures to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization 
of the economy. This position was justified, among other reasons, by the 
                                   
34 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Paras. 73-79. 
35 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 70. 
36 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 71. 
37 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 29. 
38 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 82. 
39 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 83. 
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perception that several measures developed in the BEPS project would have a 
large impact businesses benefiting from digitalization.40 
 
32. A few years down the line, the BEPS project has reignited the debate on 
revisiting allocation of taxing rights by contemplating the introduction of 
specific measures identified in Pillar 1. The work under this pillar would 
allocate a part of MNEs profit to the respective market jurisdiction. 
 
33. In the most recent development of the debate, some members of the 
inclusive framework have argued that the activity based measures (see 
section 1) have not provided a comprehensive solution to address the profit 
shifting issue.41 
 
 
34. This being said, the policy objective of introducing the GLOBLE proposal is not 
extremely clear. On the one hand, the way the proposal has been presented, 
it seems to implicitly tackle the issue of allocation of taxing rights, an issue 
which is already covered by Pillar 1. 
 
35. On the other hand, the proposal is presented with the objective of preventing 
harmful race to the bottom of corporate tax rates and the potential 
proliferation of unilateral counter measures to solve the drop in rates42. Also, 
the proposal looks beyond genuine productive activities carried out in a 
jurisdiction by focussing on rates applicable in that jurisdiction.43 As indicated 
earlier, this would represent a major policy shift44. 
 
                                   
40 OECD BEPS Action 1 Final Report. p 13 
41 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 89. 
42 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 90. 
43 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 91. 
44   Compare for example with the final report on BEPS Action 5 : « The work on harmful tax 
practices is not intended to promote the harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures 
generally within or outside the OECD, nor is it about dictating to any country what should be 
the appropriate level of tax rates. Rather, the work is about reducing the distortionary 
influence of taxation on the location of mobile financial and service activities, thereby 
encouraging an environment in which free and fair tax competition can take place. This is 
essential in moving towards a “level playing » 
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36. The proposal argues that it respects the sovereignty of States but at the same 
time also argues that when a State does not enforce its sovereignty then 
other States can go beyond their own taxing jurisdiction and exercise taxing’s 
rights on genuine business activities carried out in the former State45. While 
this proposition is per se open to debate, the proposal directly interferes with 
the sovereignty of States to set its own tax rates as well as certain policy 
choices in the way they see fit. The merits and demerits of this approach 
should be deeply considered. 
3.2. Scope of the rules and related compatibility issues 
37. At the outset the question arises with respect to carve outs from the regime. 
The question is whether substance-based activities, in general, should be 
carved out or substance based activities that are availing themselves of 
preferential regimes that have been approved by the Forum on Harmful Tax 
Competition46. With respect to the latter, the issue arises irrespective of 
whether these activities are carried out in a low tax or a high tax country as 
the income derived in these regimes will be subject to nil / minimal taxation. 
 
38. If the objective is to counter race to the bottom then arguably substance is 
not relevant as the focus would be on effective tax rates. However, such rules 
will undermine the work carried out by the BEPS Project in the context of 
BEPS Actions 8-10, Actions 5 and Action 6.   
 
39. We understand that the US GILTI regime47 only looks at effective tax rates as 
opposed to substance in the offshore entity. While the US approach seems be 
coherent on policy grounds it clearly undermines the work carried out by the 
BEPS Project. 
 
40. On the other hand, the German royalty limitation rule, which applies to 
payments subject to low effective taxation, has a carve out for royalties paid 
                                   
45 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 90. 
46 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 95 and 105.  
47 See further on this, OECD, Interim Report 2018, Para. 285. For a detailed analysis, see D. 
Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial U.S. International Tax System, Part 2, Tax Notes, July 9 
2018, 171. 
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to a nexus compliant IP box regime.48 The German approach seems to be 
“partly balanced” between Action 5 and low effective tax rate considerations.  
 
41. In our opinion, if a GLOBE type proposal would have to be devised, it should 
be premised on sound policy grounds. Thus, it should either be premised on 
the US approach which looks only at effective tax rates or should rely on a 
“comprehensive” substance carve out. The “comprehensive” substance carve 
out approach would ideally be more suitable as opposed to an approach that 
undermines the work carried out by the BEPS Project. 
 
42. That is, a “comprehensive” approach would carve out all substance-based 
activities irrespective of whether or not they are compliant with BEPS Action 
5. This would imply that the GLOBE will be hollowed out and will only be 
applicable in artificial situations. Such an approach would also comply with the 
proportionality principle to counter tax avoidance within the EU internal 
market which is currently based on the wholly artificial arrangement 
threshold49. 
 
43. A partly balanced approach i.e. an approach which carves out BEPS Action 5 
situations whereas BEPS Actions 8-10 situations are not carved out, is 
incoherent from a policy perspective and could arguably amount to a non-
neutral measures. 
 
44. Moreover, several issues arise with such an approach. Inbound or outbound 
rules, as described in the proposal, could conflict with treaty provisions. 
However, such conflicts could be avoided by designing specific rules in 
treaties that would authorize the application of such rules. On the other hand, 
implementing such inbound and outbound rules in conformity with EU law 
would not necessarily be an easy task.50  
                                   
48 See further, B. Heidecke, R. Holst, An Assessment of the Draft Rule Limiting the Deduction of 
Royalties, International Transfer Pricing Journal, May/June 2017, 216. 
49  For a comparable discussion in the framework of ATAD I and CFC rules, see for example 
Robert Danon, Some Observations on the Carve-Out Clause of Article 7(2)(a) of the ATAD with 
Regard to Third Countries in Pistone P., Weber D. (eds.) The Implementation of Anti-BEPS 
Rules in the EU : A Comprehensive Study chap. 17, IBFD, 2018; Robert Danon, La règle sur 
les sociétés contrôlées de la directive européenne anti-évasion fiscale : analyse critique et 
impact pour la Suisse in  IFF Forum für Steuerrecht, 2016 (4) pp. 286-319. 
50 OECD, 2019 Public Consultation, Para. 98. 
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45. Therefore, we express a strong reservation for the GLOBE type proposal. 
 
 
********* 
